Most philosophers support an answer to this question called"compatibilism" or "soft determinism." This view holds that freewill and determinism are really compatible--thus softening theimpact of determinism on responsibility issues, and essentiallydismissing the problem, by resolving the apparent conflict. Wethink there's a problem, on standard accounts, only because weconfuse determinism with a view of the causation of action asthoroughly independent of human decision--a view distinguished as"fatalism." On likely determinist accounts human action doesdepend on what we decide to do--and on similar internal causalfactors summed up in philosophical parlance as " the will." Determinism simply insists that these events, too, are caused byprior events and hence in the end by independent factors. But thefact that the causal chain runs through our will is enough, atleast on the usual compatibilist account, to make us responsiblemoral agents.
Determinism is basically based on the principle of cause and effect. This school of thought holds that everything in the universe happens because of a given set of circumstances. Indeterminism on the other hand is founded upon the concept that frees will. Indeterminism alleges that at any time in life, an individual has a choice. Based on this premise, it clearly emerges that both these two principles are philosophical in nature because of their relativity. In addition to this, it is also clear that one is the antonym of the other implying if one holds then the other is false. One of my fundamental beliefs is the fact the philosophy of determinism runs the world for the following reasons.
Perhaps at least part of what's at issue here is something likea version of biological "essentialism," or the Aristotelian view ofthe nature of a given entity as determining what it does--thoughAristotle had in mind a given of entity rather than anindividual, and he extended the view to kind of entity,not just a biological organism or a person capable of action. But"nature" in Aristotle's sense is distinct from "nature" in thesense of "laws of nature"--the laws governing the natural world asa whole--as presupposed by determinism and by modern science. An equivocation between these two senses of "nature"seems to lie behind the frequent reference in the biological andsocial sciences to "nature versus nurture" in connection withworries about determinism. Again, though, the philosophic problemof determinism makes no distinction between genetic andenvironmental causation--determination by one's own "nature" and byoutside factors--but rather concerns itself with any sort ofcausation that traces back beyond the agent.
The subjects in thephilosophy of Determinism and Freedom include the nature of causation,thedifferent kind of freedom that is voluntariness rather than free willororgination, and so on.
accept determinism but argue that man is free as long as his own will is one of the steps in the causal chain, even if his choices are completely predetermined for physical reasons or preordained by God.
Contrasting with the notion of free will is the concept of determinism, or, the idea that there exist conditions that could cause no other event, for every event that occurs....
If one were to accept hard determinism as true, they would have to change their relationships with other people, as they do not belief one is responsible for their actions.
In 1855, wrote,
The theory of Determinism, in which the will is determined or swayed to a particular course by external inducements and forced habits, so that the consciousness of freedom rests chiefly upon an oblivion of the antecedents of our choice.
Here we are clearly in the neighborhood of the ‘rationalappetite’ accounts of will one finds in the medievalAristotelians. The most elaborate medieval treatment is Thomas Aquinas's. His account involves identifying several distinct varieties ofwillings. Here I note only a few of his basic claims. Aquinas thinksour nature determines us to will certain general ends ordered to themost general goal of goodness. These we will of necessity, notfreely. Freedom enters the picture when we consider various means tothese ends, none of which appear to us either as unqualifiedly good oras uniquely satisfying the end we wish to fulfill. There is, then,free choice of means to our ends, along with a more basic freedom notto consider something, thereby perhaps avoiding willing it unavoidablyonce we recognized its value. Free choice is an activity that involvesboth our intellectual and volitional capacities, as it consists inboth judgment and active commitment. A thorny question for this viewis whether will or intellect is the ultimate determinant of freechoices. How we understand Aquinas on this point will go a long waystowards determining whether or not he is a sort of compatibilist aboutfreedom and determinism. (See below. Good expositions of Aquinas'account are Donagan 1985, MacDonald 1998, Stump 2003, ch.9, and Pasnau 2002, Ch.7.)
Reprinted in Morgenbesser (1962) Free Will
And now at last we can define- "determinism" and "indeterminism." Determinism is the doctrine that every event is completely determined, in the sense just defined.
However there are two types of determinism, which although have although have the same general belief, have some conflicting views in reference to definition of particular phrases especially the phrase ‘free will’.
Behavior is rational "if, and only if, it can be influenced, or inhibited by the adducing of some logically relevant consideration." (p.297) In his essay MacIntyre tries to show us that rational behavior is not causally determined, but that it comes out of our free will....
However, if you were take on the concept of soft determinists then you would not need to change you personal and emotional relationships with other people.